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Abstract
When large retailers merge, there is a concern that a sudden and marked increase
in concentration will alter the intensity and nature of price competition to the
detriment of consumers. This chapter considers just such a situation in regard
to UK grocery retailing, which has witnessed steadily increasing concentration
over recent years, advanced by a series of mergers. Speciﬁcally, we examine
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RES-062-23-1962).We are extremely grateful toArvindYadav andAndrew Farrell for their
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the nature of price competition amongst the major “one-stop-shop” retail chains
before, during, and after the Safeway/Morrisonmerger inMarch 2004.We ﬁnd the
merger offered consumers an immediate windfall beneﬁt — with average prices
falling straight after the merger — and more intriguingly appears to have led to (or
at least is associated with) a marked change in the character of price competition
in the market.
Keywords: Price competition, concentration, pricing strategies, grocery retailing.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: L40, L81, L11.
1. Introduction
Prices in the UK grocery sector fell in real terms by 7.3% in the early 2000s
(Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, 2006). Yet, over the same period, concentration
increased sharply, with the top four UK supermarket retailers increasing
their joint share from approximately 60% to 75%. Doubtless, costs might
have been lowered through scale efﬁciencies, improved organization, and
the exercise of buyer power. Even so, the falling prices may be symptomatic
of changes taking place in regard to how retailers compete, and in particular,
the pricing strategies that they employ, and not merely to do with passing
on cost savings. To analyze this, we investigate pricing strategies with
particular reference to a largemerger.At issue is whether a change inmarket
structure can fundamentally change market behavior in an unanticipated,
but in this case apparently beneﬁcial, manner with implications for evalu-
ating future scenarios of how market outcomes might evolve post-merger.
This chapter explores this issue using a balanced panel sample from a
novel dataset that covers prices for a wide range of grocery and household
products across all four major supermarket chains jointly accounting for
over 90% of the UK one-stop shopping grocery retail market (deﬁned in
the UK as grocery sales from stores greater than 1,400 sq. m). The dataset
used is based onweekly-updated price data on individual items covering the
period from November 2003 to November 2006, during which time, there
was signiﬁcant change in the structure of the market, the completion of the
Safeway/Morrison (hereafter, S/M) merger in March 2004, consolidating
the position of the fourth player. Otherwise, this time period is characterized
by themacroeconomically benign environment of growth andmild inﬂation
now called the Great Moderation. For the period investigated, we ﬁnd a
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strong incidence of net price reductions. The evidence suggests that the
primary driver of falling prices during this period has been higher priced
ﬁrms cutting prices (rather than lower priced ﬁrms cutting prices further) as
they shifted from traditional high-low (“HiLo”) promotional-based pricing
toward value-oriented every-day low pricing (“EDLP”), whilst retaining
promotional elements—a hybrid strategy that all fourmajor players appear
to have adopted to a greater or lesser extent by the end of the period studied.1
For this market, a move toward price convergence is associated with
a change in the character of price competition triggered by increased
concentration and an intensifying battle for market share.Yet, the real price
reductions overallmask amore complexpicture of price changes,withmany
falls at the same time as substantial increases in prices on other products.
Viewed in policy terms, this era may have an important bearing on
how competition authorities should view retail mergers, with the need to
distinguish those likely to promote a shift toward more intense, rather than
less intense, competition to the beneﬁt of consumers. The UK competition
authorities were faced with four possible merger scenarios, out of which
they chose one (with relatively minor restrictions regarding the small
number of areas where the merging parties overlapped signiﬁcantly). The
short-term indications are that they got this right, in the sense that the
other possible mergers would have led to a more asymmetric concentrated
structure and an outside ﬁrm is likely to have found greater difﬁculty in
delivering cost reductions.
There remains a lingering concern that as the post-merger market
settles, and positions stabilize, then competitive intensitymaywane, leading
to the prospect of future price rises. Yet, at least for the period studied
here, examined purely in terms of the impact on consumer welfare through
1Bolton and Shankar (2003) provide empirical support for the view that retailers’ pricing
policies operate along a spectrum of positions (rather than simple “either–or” choices) in
respect of the average price levels used, the frequency of price changes, and the nature of
retail promotions. Moreover, as shown by Ellickson and Misra (2008) in the context of
U.S. supermarkets, retailers may tailor their pricing strategy choices (e.g., EDLP, HiLo, or a
hybrid position) at store level, according to prevailing local market conditions and the nature
of local competition. This position is noticeably different to that applying in the UK where
grocery retailers generally commit to a pricing strategy that applies across their entire store
chain or at least to different store-size categories and linked to their retail brand and store
fascia (e.g., Competition Commission, 2000).
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effects on prices, our analysis provides support for the arguments made by
the UK competition authorities in allowing the S/M merger (rather than the
other contemplated mergers) in an already quite concentrated market. Our
sample suggests that consumers saw an immediate windfall beneﬁt from
the merger — with price cuts across a wide range of products following
completion of themerger; although,we establish close correlation in timing,
this is clearly not the same as establishing causation.2
Beyond the rapid post-merger drop in prices, we also ﬁnd evidence that
the nature of price changes and competitor responses changed more gen-
erally over the period. In particular, leader–follower patterns and response
timings appear to have shifted as the price gap narrowed across the main
retailers. Indeed, there is evidence of asymmetric leader–follower positions,
with one retailer tending to lead on price rises while another retailer tends to
lead on price falls.We also ﬁnd that, while an increasing number of products
were identically priced across all the main retailers, even where price gaps
remained, theywere often as small as a single penny across the four retailers.
A signiﬁcant proportion of the price changes, particularly decreases, were
a single penny, indicating a willingness to pass on lower costs and/or
seeking to gain or maintain the lowest price position (and thus enhance
their reputation with consumers) — and suggesting low menu costs.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review
developments in the UK grocery sector, examining changes in market
concentration and the nature of the leading players in the “one-stop
shopping” market. In Section 3, we discuss the source and nature of the
pricing data used. In Section 4, we assess the four main retailers’ price
change decisions in terms of patterns over time (particularly in view of the
S/M merger, examining average prices, direction and magnitude of price
changes, and the extent of price alignment across the retailers), patterns
2A quite different structural approach to the analysis of thismerger is carried out by Skrianka
(2012). He focuses on the geographic distribution of demand using TNS Worldpanel
consumer micro-data. Given the structural nature of the model, he is able (subject to his
maintained assumptions) to recover estimates of consumer welfare, as well as proﬁts. His
paper suggests that the S/Mmerger had little impact, but that amerger of SafewaywithTesco
would have had a greater negative impact on consumers. His model relies on recovering
marginal costs and also is comparative static in nature, so he is not able, for example, to
investigate leader–follower behavior and the like.
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across product types, and evidence of leader–follower behavior. Section 5
concludes the chapter.
2. UK Grocery Retailing and One-Stop Shopping
Grocery retailing is signiﬁcantly the largest retail sector in the UK. Total
sales through UK grocery outlets were around £120 billion (approximately
$200 billion) in 2005 (Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, 2006). Of this total, around
£95 billion comprised grocery sales, with the remainder made up of sales of
non-grocery items. Groceries account for nearly half of all UK retail sales,
and around 13% of all household spending (IGD, 2005). Four retailers —
Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda (owned by Wal-Mart), and Morrison/Safeway —
dominate the national market, accounting for around 75% of grocery retail
sales (covering food and drink, cleaning products, toiletries, and household
goods), and indeed 30% of all retail sales in the UK.3
These four supermarket retailers have primarily positioned themselves
as “one-stop shops”, operating with very wide product ranges in large
format stores. They jointly account for over 90% of grocery sales for stores
with sales areas exceeding 1,400 sq. m (approximately 15,000 sq. ft) —
the critical size above which the UK competition authorities view as
distinguishing one-stop grocery shops, serving a separate economic market
for primary shopping needs (where consumers could buy all their grocery
needs in a single store, perhaps with a single weekly shopping trip),
from smaller stores catering more for secondary (e.g., “top-up” and
“convenience”) grocery shopping needs.4
With such high concentration and concerns about the exercise ofmarket
power, theUKauthorities have investigated the sector several times in recent
years. The Competition Commission’s market investigation completed in
3For further details, see IGD (2005) and Mintel (2005). Tesco alone is estimated to take
more than one-eighth of UK consumer retail expenditure.
4More formally, the Competition Commission (2000, Paragraph 2.26) deﬁned “one-stop
shopping” as “the shop for the bulk of a household’s weekly grocery needs, carried out in a
single trip and under one roof”. This is distinguished by the Competition Commission from
other forms of shopping, characterized as “secondary shopping”, which typically involve
the greater use of other types of grocery stores, a different product mix and a lower average
basket spend.
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Table 1. Market Characteristics in UK Grocery Retailing, 1998–1999
National market shares
Main UK
grocery
retailers
General character
and pricing
policy
Total
grocery
stores
All
grocery
stores (%)
Grocery
stores
>1,400
sq. m (%)
Grocery
stores
>2,300
sq. m (%)
One-stop shops
Tesco Value-led HiLo 642 23.0 28.5 29.5
Sainsbury HiLo 424 18.7 24.8 27.5
Asda EDLP 227 12.2 16.8 20.8
Safeway HiLo 498 11.5 13.8 11.0
Morrison EDLP+ deals 95 3.9 5.4 6.6
Other chains
Somerﬁeld/
Kwik Save
HiLo Soft
Discount
1,442 9.8 3.1 0.8
M&S Premium 294 4.9 2.2 2.0
Waitrose Premium 119 3.0 2.5 0.4
Aldi Hard Discount 219 1.4 0.0 0.0
Lidl Hard Discount 173 0.9 0.0 0.0
Netto Hard Discount 120 0.7 0.0 0.0
Budgens HiLo 177 0.7 0.0 0.0
Iceland Specialized/deals 770 3.0 0.0 0.0
Booth Premium 24 0.2 0.1 0.0
Co-operatives HiLo 1,920 6.4 2.8 1.5
Source: Dobson and Waterson (2008) adapted from Competition Commission (2000;
Tables 5.2 and 5.6, Appendices 5.2 and 7.1).
2000 provided a very detailed analysis of the structure of the relevant
markets and the behavior andperformanceof themain supermarkets groups.
Table 1 shows some of the key market characteristics identiﬁed at that time,
with just ﬁve players dominating the one-stop shopping market as served
by larger grocery stores.
In March 2004, the “Big 5” became the “Big 4” with the merger of
Safeway and Morrison. This followed an investigation by the Competition
Commission in 2003 into contemplated mergers with Safeway as consid-
ered by all four of the other top 5 one-stop shopping retailers. However,
prospective mergers with Tesco, Sainsbury, and Asda/Wal-Mart were all
blocked on grounds that competition would likely be signiﬁcantly reduced
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Table 2. Retailer Market Shares for Stores Greater than 1,400 sq. m in Great Britain,
1998–2003
01/1998 01/1999 01/2000 01/2001 01/2002 01/2003
1998/2003
gain/loss
Tesco 28.5 28.8 29.5 29.9 30.8 31.3 2.8
Sainsbury 26.5 26.0 25.1 23.6 22.4 21.9 −4.6
Asda 17.1 17.6 18.7 19.8 20.4 21.5 4.4
Safeway 12.6 12.9 12.2 13.0 12.7 12.0 −0.6
Morrison 5.4 5.7 6.4 7.1 7.5 7.6 2.2
Others 9.9 9.0 8.1 6.6 6.2 5.7 −4.2
Source: Dobson (2005) adapted from Competition Commission (2003; Tables 3.2 and 5.17)
(based on TNS till roll data).
(as identiﬁed by the Commission’s consideration of potential unilateral
and coordinated effects arising from such mergers). Morrison was allowed
to proceed subject to a number of store divestments. Table 2 shows the
trends inmarket shares identiﬁed in the CompetitionCommission’s inquiry,
revealing strong growth in the positions of Tesco, Asda, and Morrison,
relative decline in the position of Sainsbury and some decline in Safeway
and other retailers in the one-stop shopping market.
Nevertheless, continued concern about the market power held by the
main players and increasing levels of concentration, as well as the move
by some of the key players (notably Tesco and Sainsbury) to enter the
convenience store sector, led to a further full sector inquiry in 2008. This
latest inquiry focused on relations in the supply chain (with concerns about
the buyer power of themajor retailers), possible anticompetitive practices in
retail markets (with concerns about below cost selling and targeted pricing),
and entry barriers (notably, the role and implications of current planning
restrictions in the UK and high levels of local concentration).
In the period after the 2000 Competition Commission market investi-
gation, it was noticeable that the positions of the leading ﬁrms changed
somewhat, especially with regard to their pricing policy. In particular,
“HiLo” promotional pricing was largely abandoned, with Safeway’s
extreme HiLo pricing being replaced by Morrison’s more consistent value-
oriented pricing policy, and a move by Sainsbury toward a similar value-
oriented position, operating with broadly low everyday prices with some
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promotional deals. This is also the position essentially adopted byTesco and
even Asda modiﬁed its EDLP approach to encompass promotional deals.
Thus, the previously more polarized positions gave way to a more common
value-led approach shared by all leading players, if to slightly different
degrees and with different emphases.5 The common emphasis became
building chains with consistent national appeal through the adoption of
national pricing and marketing policies, rather than tailoring offers to local
markets (as may be more common in other countries and other retail
sectors). For example, local price ﬂexing (that is adjusting prices according
to local competitive conditions) largely gave way to a situation where all
four major players adopted national prices in the UK one-stop shopping
market (i.e., for large sized stores) — a market feature that will prove
particularly useful in the context of our price comparison analysis overwhat
has what has turned out to be a very important period in the development
of this sector.
3. The Data
Our price data are drawn from a price comparison service provided by
tesco.com (at www.tesco.com/pricecheck) — the UK’s leading Internet
retail operation and runby theUK’s leading retailer,Tesco plc. Starting from
late 2003, this website provided price comparisons, updated weekly, on
initially about 4,000 items, growing to over 10,000 individual items, across
the leading four supermarket retailers in the UK — Tesco, Sainsbury,Asda,
and Safeway (replaced later with Morrison).6 The reported prices, stated
by Tesco as being independently collected, are based on the most common
(i.e., mode) value for one to three similarly sized superstores (i.e., excluding
5For details on the points of difference in the nature of the pricing policies used by the
key players, see Verdict Research (2005), also Competition Commission (2003, 2008) on
pricing policies more generally.
6The Pricecheck service was used by Tesco as a marketing ploy to allow it to demonstrate
how many lower prices it had compared to rivals in its advertising claims. Of course, it
is possible that the presence of the website itself led to behavioral changes. Certainly, we
see some price alignment taking place between Tesco and Asda in the early weeks (Seaton
and Waterson, 2013). The Tesco Pricecheck service ended in late 2008 with a move to a
different marketing ploy and advertising campaign, Tesco Baskets, showing comparisons
across baskets of products, rather than individual items.
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smaller store formats operated by these retailers, such as Tesco Metro
and Sainsbury’s Local) around Great Britain for each of these four retail
chains and the prices relate to single items/packages (i.e., they do not cover
multi-buy offers such as “buy one, get one free”, “three for the price of
two”, etc.).7
Crucially (and very different from countries such as the U.S. and
France, where retailer chains invariably price locally), these retailers have
adopted uniformnational pricing policies. Speciﬁcally, in keepingwith their
publicly stated commitments, the “Big 4” retailers, i.e., Tesco, Sainsbury,
Asda, and Morrison, each use a national pricing policy at superstore level
with no local price deviations in this market (Competition Commission,
2003). Accordingly, the reported prices would normally be expected to
apply across every superstore operated by that retailer for the whole of
Britain.8 Hence, this price comparison service should provide reliable
coverage for individual item prices for the supermarkets that account for
over 90% of the one-stop shopping grocery market expected to operate in
Britain.
Our data covers a complete three-year period. Data collection began
with the published comparisons for November 10, 2003, on the basis of
prices ordered by “aisle” within the store. All available price comparisons
made in respect of “aisles” were then subsequently collected from theTesco
7In operating the Pricecheck service, Tesco stated that they tried to ensure that the prices
displayed on the website were fair, representative, and accurate. Tesco argued there was no
bias in the choice of products for comparison with equivalent products always compared
(e.g., Tesco’s “Value” brand was always compared with the other supermarkets’own budget
brands). More broadly, it was claimed that a like-for-like basis was consistently used for
comparisons. If the price collector did not obtain a comparable size for a product, then the
nearest size was taken and the price converted pro-rata. If there was no size that would
fairly compare with the Tesco product, then it was not included. If a product was found
to be sold out in a store, then the price recorded on the shelf was used. If a product had a
price mark that was different from the shelf price, then whichever was the lower price was
taken.
8It is this feature of national pricing policies that makes this particular price comparison
service and more recently developed ones, like mysupermarket.co.uk, extremely useful and
amenable in allowing analysis of prices in the present UK context. Clearly, such a service
would be less useful in other countries (e.g., theU.S.)where local pricing in the retail grocery
sector predominates (e.g., Montgomery (1997), Chintagunta et al. (2003), and Ellickson and
Misra (2008)).
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Pricecheck website for each week in which the data were updated through
to November 13, 2006. While prices were updated for most weeks, there
were a number of early weeks in which prices were not updated on the
website. For the 158 weeks covered in this period, we were able to collect
data for 129 weeks (i.e., 29 missing weeks).9
In any given week, only around a third of the items had comparisons
across all four retailers.Also, the goods on which all four comparisons were
made changed over time, and even from week to week.10 In addition, there
were changes in the composition of products covered, as well as individual
product introductions and deletions over time. The net result is that we were
left with 539 items on which we had prices at all four retailers for every
week in which data were collected to allow us to construct a balanced panel
over this period of three years. These items cover products in 9 of the 12
broad categories (“aisles”) identiﬁed on the website, with a mix of branded
and own-label goods, a range of different package sizes, and broad spread
of prices, thus providing a wide but not full representation of products
stocked.11 Table 3 provides some summary details.
9Prices were updated weekly up to mid-December 2003 but then were updated more
erratically (sometimes only twice a month) through to July 2004, after which they were
updated more consistently on a weekly basis through to December 2004, but then again
erratically (though often fortnightly) through to July 2005, after which the prices were
mostly updated weekly. The most noticeable and consistent gap in the series relates to the
two weeks covering each Christmas and NewYear (which could be an indication that store
prices were themselves not changed signiﬁcantly over this interval — as found by other
studies, e.g., Müller et al. (2006)).
10Absences on the website were shown as “not found” (“N/F”), indicating that the product
(or its like-for-like equivalent) could not be found in the retailer (which may have been
because it was not stocked, but could also have been due to the researchers not having
sufﬁcient time to locate and record the price — hence accounting for the ﬂuctuation in
weekly recorded prices and why coverage varies across categories and across retailers).
Four-way comparisons ranged from as high as 40% of the items covered in some weeks to
as low as 25% in other weeks, though commonly around 30–35% of items covered.
11In particular, we note that there is an absence of “fruit and vegetable” and “meat, ﬁsh, and
poultry” prices as these only became available from mid-2004 onwards. Also, there were
no recorded prices in the “newsagent” aisle (e.g., cigarettes) during this period. In addition,
there were certain “shelves” within “aisles” where either recorded prices commenced at a
later date or were never covered (e.g., “sweet morning goods” in the bakery aisle and “bags
of sweets” in the grocery aisle, amongst several others).
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Table 3. Sample Characteristics
Aisle
Number
of items
Own-
label
(%)
Minimum
price (£)
Maximum
price (£)
Mean
price
(£)
Median
price
(£)
Mode
price
(£)
Bakery 11 64 0.19 2.39 0.81 0.73 1.04
Grocery 289 28 0.15 5.86 0.99 0.84 0.64
Frozen foods 10 10 0.46 5.69 1.79 1.48 1.79
General goods 51 24 0.33 6.71 1.68 1.39 1.28
Deli and dairy 40 28 0.19 16.90 1.35 0.98 0.38
Health and beauty 37 14 0.29 9.25 1.86 1.67 1.68
Off-license 41 7 1.22 26.65 8.47 7.12 1.54
Pet foods 20 10 0.24 4.99 1.34 0.98 0.47
Beverages 40 18 0.13 6.58 2.01 1.93 2.98
Full Sample 539 24 0.13 26.65 1.81 1.05 0.98
4. Pricing Developments
We examine in some depth across various dimensions the pricing develop-
ments in the British grocery market as the S/M merger was taking place.
The data consists of prices, pﬁw, charged by ﬁrm f = 1, . . . , 4 (Tesco,
Sainsbury, Safeway/Morrison, and Asda) for item i = 1, 2, . . . , 539 for
weeks w = 1, 2, . . . , 158 (running from November 10, 2003 (w = 1)
to November 13, 2006 (w = 158)). As 29 of the 158 time periods are
missing, it proves convenient to redeﬁne our observations to replacewwith t
covering observations t = 1, . . . , 129 — see Table A1 in the Appendix for
details. With 129 weekly observations on 539 goods, we have 69,531 price
observations for each retailer, 278,124 observations overall. The number of
“valid” price change pﬁw observations is reduced measurably by missing
observations; this can of course be addressed by both careful estimation
and appropriate interpolation procedures.
A further complicating feature of the sample relates to the merger of
Safeway and Morrison, formally completed on March 8, 2004 but with
Safeway store conversions, into the Morrison format, taking place over
subsequent months. Pricecheck recorded Safeway prices until mid-August
2004, after which it replaced Safeway with Morrison.Accordingly, our data
can be split into three key sub-periods: “pre-merger” (from November 10,
2003 to February 23, 2004, i.e., w = 1–16, t = 1–11), “post-merger with
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Safeway data” (from March 15, 2004 toAugust 16, 2004, i.e., w = 19–41,
t = 12–24); and “post-merger with Morrison data” (fromAugust 23, 2004
to November 13, 2006, i.e., w = 42–158, t = 25–129).
4.1. Firm-level average prices
To provide a broad indication of how prices developed over the observed
time period, Figure 1 shows the indexed (unweighted) ﬁrm-level mean
average prices for the sample of items. The market exhibits sharply
declining prices inS/M12 (labeled simplyMorrison in theﬁgure, for brevity)
and more modestly declining prices in Sainsbury, after which the trend is
more ﬂat except in pre-Christmas periods where prices dip and then rise
again each post-NewYear. The latter feature appears to be driven by heavy
discounting of particular relatively more expensive products in the sample,
notably alcoholic beverages.
Figure 1. Mean prices over time (unweighted mean with Tesco ﬁrst week as base= 100).
12This is consistent with casual speculation at the time that Safeway faced a relatively high
cost base.
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4.2. Direction of price changes
Tesco, the market leader and the retailer that changed its prices most, made
4,492 price changes, representing just over 5% of the data or equivalent
to about eight price changes for each item over the entire period (i.e., a
change approximately every16weeks).Asda, in linewith its declaredEDLP
approach, changed its prices the least often, with 2,858 price changes, about
ﬁve changes per item over the three years.
Despite the appearance from Figure 1 of the trends in average prices
for the retailers being broadly ﬂat, with the notable exception of Safeway/
Morrison, there were in fact substantially more price falls than price rises
over the period, as shown in Figure 2. The falls tend to be small in size and
the rises larger. Interestingly, this ﬁnding is the reverse of U.S. evidence,
e.g., Levy et al. (2004) who found for a U.S. grocery chain that price rises
outnumbered price falls but with rises typically being small compared to
price falls, perhaps indicative of a different competitive dynamic at play
than in the U.S. (Levy et al., 2004; Hosken et al., 2000).13
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
Tesco Sainsbury Morriso sda
Rises Falls
Figure 2. Percentage of price changes by each retailer (average percentage of falls/rises
per week).
13Note there is little evidence of price stickiness in our data. Nakamura (2008), with a
different U.S. supermarket sample, also ﬁnds scant evidence of price stickiness.
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4.3. Magnitude of price changes
Examining the monetary amounts involved in the price changes reveals
that, in a large proportion of cases, price changes involved just a few pence.
Indeed, a change of just one penny was the most common price change.
Figures 3a and 3b respectively show the cumulative frequencies for price
falls and price rises (1p–50p) for each retailer.
Investigating further whether the patterns were different for price rises
than price falls, and whether these altered over the three sub-periods
associated with the S/M merger, Table 4 details the extent of price changes
in percentage terms. The upper panel shows the price increases in the ranges
up to 10% for all four retailers through each of three sub-periods. It can
be observed that such price increases account for less than a sixth of all
increases made by Safeway in sub-period one, whereas they account for
around a half by the other three retailers, but the pattern is more similar for
all four retailers in the two subsequent sub-periods. The lower panel shows
the position regarding price falls. Here again we ﬁnd that Safeway has a
relatively small number of low price falls (see Figure 3a). Its price cuts tend
to be larger, especially in sub-periods one and two but in sub-period three
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Figure 3a. Cumulative frequency: price falls (1p–50p).
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Figure 3b. Cumulative frequency: price rises (1p–50p).
Table 4. Extent of Price Change (Percentage) over Different Sub-Periods
Sub-period Percent range Tesco Sainsbury’s
Safeway/
Morrison Asda
Price rises (in pence)
One 0–1 2.4 0.8 0 1.3
0–10 47.2 50.4 16.6 50.7
Two 0–1 0.6 1.1 1.1 3.5
0–10 48.9 45.2 45.1 65.2
Three 0–1 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.2
0–10 41.5 48.2 47.2 42.2
Price falls (in pence)
One 0–1 13.6 1.5 0.5 11.6
0–10 71.7 45.3 15.7 86.0
Two 0–1 8.5 7.2 0.2 10.6
0–10 54.4 66.7 22.1 68.2
Three 0–1 13.5 5.7 4.6 10.6
0–10 61.2 59.2 53.6 56.5
these become roughly the same as the other three retailers. In contrast,
the Tesco and Asda price falls are relatively small, particularly in sub-
period one. Sainsbury generally adopted an intermediate position but with
high proportion of price falls in period two, most of which were small
18 R. Chakraborty et al.
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Figure 4a. Net price falls of 10p or more.
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Figure 4b. Net price falls of 9p or less.
Note: Averaged (falls minus rises) over retailer per week for 539 products.
but serving to bring its prices closer into line with Tesco and Asda, as
well as Safeway following a wave of cutting prices after the Morrison
takeover.
At the market level, it is not uncommon simultaneously to observe
net price falls in regard to small price changes but net price rises with
larger price changes. This is shown in Figures 4a and 4b, where particularly
toward the end of the period, there were many small price falls but these
were largely offset by fewer but larger price rises. Indeed, only near the start
of the period, when Safeway stores were experiencing price cuts after being
acquired by Morrison, do we observe signiﬁcant net falls in both large and
small amounts.
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4.4. Price alignment
The price data indicates that the S/M merger in 2004 had a profound
effect in terms of the alignment of prices in the market. As discussed in
Section 2, where formerly there was a marked difference in the pricing
policies employed by each of the leading retailers, ranging from extreme
HiLo pricing to pure EDLP, positions considerably narrowed such that
all four main players subsequently adopted to a greater or lesser degree
a similar hybrid strategy, EDLP-based but combined with limited intense
promotional pricing. Consistent with this development, Figure 5 reveals
a very signiﬁcant narrowing in the gap in prices over the period studied.
At our starting point, prior to the S/M merger, there was signiﬁcant price
dispersion with almost no products identically priced by all four players
and with the spread of prices less than 10p for only around 15% of items.
However, subsequent to the merger, prices dramatically converged. By the
end of our sample period, a third of the items were identically priced across
retailers, over half exhibited a price gap of 3p or less, and 70% a spread of
10p or less. As a measure of the spread of prices and a further indication of
the extent of price convergence, we ﬁnd the average coefﬁcient of variation
declined by three-quarters. While product characteristics appear relevant
in explaining the extent of price alignment, the merger appears to have
Figure 5. Price gap (in pence) across all four retailers on all items.
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played a critical role, leading immediately to lower prices in Safeway (on
being acquired by Morrison), and a subsequent response by Sainsbury also
lowering prices, drawing both retailers much closer to the prices offered by
Tesco and Asda, a trend which continued over time. Accordingly, we ﬁnd
that prices not only drew closer, but generally converged toward a lower
level.
4.5. Patterns across product types
Differences in the volatility of prices by aisles are shown in Figure 6.
Alcohol items in particular appear subject to more frequent price changes,
with a tendency for many of these items to have short-term discounts before
reverting back to higher prices (particularly around each Christmas/New
Year period).14 Examining more detailed data, it is evident that there
is a greater propensity for leading branded goods, especially in relation
to alcohol and beverages, household and pet food goods, to have more
volatile prices, characteristic of short-term promotional activity on such
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Figure 6. Probability of price change by Aisles.
14This is consistent with recent empirical work showing that prices can fall on products in
periods of high demand — see McDonald (2000), Chevalier et al. (2003), and Nevo and
Hatzitaskos (2005).
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Figure 7. Percentage of price changes that are rises by Aisle.
items (e.g., Hosken and Reiffen, 2004). In addition, though, the extent of
changing prices for such products varies from retailer to retailer. Tesco
and Sainsbury appear to change prices more frequently on these products
(perhaps indicative of their greater use of short-term promotional discount
pricing by these two retailers).
As evident from Figure 7, only one category — health and beauty —
stands out for having considerably more price falls than price rises. Even
so, net price falls over the period characterized almost all categories.
4.6. Leader–follower behavior
We next consider the individual price changes made by each retailer to
see whether there are any discernible patterns of competitive interaction
in terms of the timing of price changes with respect to rivals’ behavior.15
For each price change made by a retailer on a particular item, we consider
price changes around this event made by the other retailers on this same
item. Speciﬁcally, for a 2n + 1 week window around each retailer’s price
change, we record whether any other retailer raises or lowers their price
15A more extensive investigation of price leadership as between Tesco and Asda over an
extended period is reported in Seaton andWaterson (2013). Though the methodology differs
signiﬁcantly, and the timeframe is somewhat different, the results are broadly in line with
those reported here.
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for that product in the same week (w), the preceding n weeks (w − 1, w −
2, . . . , w − n) and the following n weeks (w + 1, w + 2, . . . , w + n).
A high count of price changes before the retailer moves indicates that the
retailer is a price follower, a clump of high counts following w suggests
that the retailer is a price leader, while a peak around w indicates that the
retailers move together (changing prices in the same week). In order to
avoid the problem of missing observations, we calculate our results using
the maximal window possible up to n = 3.
To simplify exposition, we compute a statistic to examine the symmetry
of competitor price change, in the same direction, around the ﬁrm’s price
change event at w,
LF(n)% = 100 ×
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
[Sum of counts (w + 1, . . . , w + n)
−Sum of counts (w − 1, . . . , w − n)]
[Total counts at
(w − n, . . . , w − 1, w + 1, . . . , w + n)]
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
This statistic compares the symmetry of price changes on each side of the
one ﬁrm’s price changes at time w. A value of plus one (100%) indicates
every other ﬁrm that has reacted, did so after this leader ﬁrm (f ) — whereas
minus one (−100%) means all react before, and this ﬁrm is a follower.
A value close to zero implies price changes were mostly in the same
week, or that the distribution is uniform. The results of our analysis are
presented in Table 5, where we disaggregate the data, by price type (rise or
fall) and sample period (all weeks, pre-merger, S/M merger, post-merger
Morrison).We use a chi-squared test to assess thewhether the distribution is
signiﬁcantly different from a symmetric one at the 5% level (indicated by ∗).
Taking ﬁrst the whole sample period, there is evidence that in terms
of price leadership both Tesco and Asda play a strong role. However, their
roles appear asymmetric. Asda often leads on price reductions while Tesco
often leads price increases. Furthermore, follower behavior appears to be
strongly associated with Asda in regard to following the price rises made
by others. In contrast, it is Sainsbury and Morrison that both appear to
be followers in response to price changes; Sainsbury’s having by far the
stronger reaction.
The dynamics become particularly interesting when the sample is split
into the three sub-periods discussed above in relation to the S/M merger.
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Table 5. Price Change Event Window (±3 Weeks)
Period
Falls
chi sq
Falls
LF%
Falls
indicate Chi sq
Rises
LF%
Rises
indicate
Tesco All 0.82 2.34 Leader 302.76∗ 50.21 Leader
Sainsbury All 34.37∗ −20.13 Follower 20.40∗ −15.34 Follower
Morrison All 1.75 −5.15 Follower 1.38 −4.17 Follower
Asda All 33.78∗ 17.41 Leader 153.28∗ −39.92 Follower
Tesco 1 2.17 −21.74 Follower 3.77 53.85 Leader
Sainsbury 1 0.29 −14.29 Follower 2.00 −50.00 Follower
Morrison 1 1.00 −20.00 Follower 0.89 −22.22 Follower
Asda 1 0.33 16.67 Leader 7.36∗ −81.82 Follower
Tesco 2 0.86 −17.24 Follower 0.39 13.04 Leader
Sainsbury 2 0.00 0.00 / 0.14 14.29 Leader
Morrison 2 1.92 38.46 Leader 1.29 42.86 Leader
Asda 2 30.77∗ 76.92 Leader 2.57 −42.86 Follower
Tesco 3 1.76 3.52 Leader 301.84∗ 50.90 Leader
Sainsbury 3 36.81∗ −20.80 Follower 19.81∗ −15.26 Follower
Morrison 3 1.86 −5.47 Follower 1.34 −4.18 Follower
Asda 3 22.00∗ 14.48 Leader 145.32∗ −39.38 Follower
∗Signiﬁcantly different from symmetric at the 5% level.
Again from Table 5, in sub-period 1 (i.e., prior to S/M merger), Tesco and
Asda appear to set the price change agenda but with largely asymmetric
positions — Tesco leading price rises,Asda leading price falls. Meanwhile,
Sainsbury and Safeway generally act as price followers: the former consis-
tently in regard to price rises, the latter in regard to price falls. As sample
sizes diminish though, so does the statistical power of our tests, and only
one relationship is found signiﬁcant here (Asda as price follower for rises).
In sub-period 2, similarly we only have one signiﬁcant result — this
time for Asda as a leader in price falls. Safeway (after its takeover by
Morrison) is largely lowering prices on its own, and while Sainsbury
leads on some price increases, it is predominantly Asda that leads on both
reductions andTesco on increases. However, in sub-period 3, Tesco is again
a price leader in raising prices, while Asda is a leader in lowering prices (if
not to the same degree as in the previous two periods) and also a follower
in raising prices. Both Sainsbury and Morrison appear as followers in both
price rises and price falls.
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In terms of net positions, for the pre-merger sub-period, Tesco andAsda
appear to balance each other with asymmetric leadership positions, respec-
tively in price increases and price reductions. Post-merger, Tesco appears
to have a greater impact on price increases, with the other three players and
especially Asda following Tesco, while Asda’s role as setting lower prices
for others to follow seems somewhat reduced in the ﬁnal sub-period.
Accordingly, we ﬁnd evidence of leader–follower behavior but that
the patterns have changed somewhat over time, partly in the aftermath of
the S/M merger where just one retailer — the market leader, Tesco —
increasingly tended to act as price leader in price rises, perhaps reﬂecting
its growing domination of the sector (possessing double the market share
of its nearest rivals) and the reduced inﬂuence of the other players to lead
price changes.
5. Conclusion
As a tight oligopoly, with four retailers controlling 90% of the national
market, the UK’s “one-stop-shopping” retail grocery market has witnessed
considerable consolidation in recent years, driven by organic growth of the
leading players and a major merger (S/M) in 2004.
Given this context, this chapter has sought to draw on a novel data
source to examine the nature and extent of price competition in this market,
examining the character of price changes and competitor responses amongst
the four leading UK supermarket chains over a three-year period. We
provide summary data analysis on three speciﬁc aspects: (i) the nature
and pattern of price changes and whether changes in market structure
have altered price change behavior, (ii) the extent of price dispersion and
whether price gaps are widening or narrowing; and (iii) any evidence of
price leadership behavior.
Despite increased concentration in an already concentrated market,
price competition appears to have remained intense,with eachmajor retailer
competing to increase its level of sales and improve its market share. We
ﬁnd that Safeway/Morrison prices fell post-merger (as promised), offering
consumers an immediate windfall beneﬁt. This is consistent with the view
that Safeway was a high-cost ﬁrm with the merger achieving lower costs
across the merged group; a straightforward Bertrand–Nash model would
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predict this outcome, provided the cost falls are large enough relative to the
impact of concentration on margins.Associated with this, we ﬁnd that price
differences across the Big 4 narrowed considerably over time, as prices set
by Morrison and indeed Sainsbury moved closer to those of Tesco and
Asda. Much less easily explained by such oligopoly models are various
other phenomena. Whilst the number of price falls exceeded price rises
by around a third, most falls tended to be small, with the net result that
average prices were almost exactly the same at the end of the three-year
period as they were at the start (suggesting signiﬁcant real price deﬂation
over the period). Yet, we observed changed pricing behavior of all four
players over different sub-periods relating to the S/M merger. There is also
some indication of asymmetric leadership roles — Tesco leading price
increases, Asda leading price falls. Of course, there are likely to have been
other drivers of these phenomena, apart from the merger.
This case study shows how the nature of competition can change
quite markedly and yet subtly in the wake of market consolidation. Such
a prospect makes predicting the outcomes from proposed mergers and
other concentrations difﬁcult for competition authorities, given the limited
concordancewitholigopoly theory.Theusual assumption inmerger analysis
is that in the absence of signiﬁcant cost savings being generated and (at least
partly) passed on to consumers then concentration-increasing mergers
may well be anticompetitive based on the assumption that competitive
interaction will continue in a predictable manner from past behavior.
The analysis here demonstrates that the whole nature of competitive
interaction can change if price strategies change. For the UK authorities
simultaneously investigating four different contemplated mergers between
Safeway and other leading industry players all having a concentrating
effect on the market, they appear to have made the right decision in
allowing the acquisition by Morrison given the subsequent evolution of
market prices, at least in the time period considered here. At the time of
the investigation, Morrison promised to make immediate and signiﬁcant
price cuts in Safeway stores and they duly delivered these, but it was
the subsequent scramble for market share that appears to have led to the
other pricing changes identiﬁed in this study emerging, with the apparent
change in the whole dynamic of competitive interaction in this industry.
Such consequences need very detailed and careful consideration.
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Appendix
Table A1. Observation Dates
Week
no. (w)
Obs
(t) Day Month Year
Week
no. (w)
Obs
(t) Day Month Year
1 1 10 November 2003 91 66 1 August 2005
2 2 17 November 2003 92 67 8 August 2005
3 3 24 November 2003 93 68 15 August 2005
4 4 1 December 2003 94 69 22 August 2005
5 5 8 December 2003 95 70 29 August 2005
6 6 15 December 2003 96 71 5 September 2005
10 7 12 January 2004 98 72 19 September 2005
12 8 26 January 2004 99 73 26 September 2005
14 9 9 February 2004 100 74 3 October 2005
15 10 16 February 2004 101 75 10 October 2005
16 11 23 February 2004 102 76 17 October 2005
19 12 15 March 2004 103 77 24 October 2005
22 13 5 April 2004 104 78 1 November 2005
25 14 26 April 2004 105 79 7 November 2005
27 15 10 May 2004 106 80 14 November 2005
29 16 24 May 2004 107 81 21 November 2005
33 17 21 June 2004 108 82 28 November 2005
34 18 28 June 2004 109 83 5 December 2005
35 19 5 July 2004 110 84 12 December 2005
36 20 12 July 2004 113 85 3 January 2006
37 21 19 July 2004 114 86 9 January 2006
38 22 26 July 2004 115 87 16 January 2006
39 23 2 August 2004 116 88 23 January 2006
41 24 16 August 2004 117 89 30 January 2006
42 25 23 August 2004 118 90 6 February 2006
43 26 31 August 2004 119 91 13 February 2006
44 27 6 September 2004 120 92 20 February 2006
46 28 20 September 2004 121 93 27 February 2006
47 29 27 September 2004 122 94 6 March 2006
48 30 4 October 2004 123 95 13 March 2006
49 31 11 October 2004 124 96 20 March 2006
50 32 18 October 2004 125 97 27 March 2006
51 33 25 October 2004 126 98 3 April 2006
52 34 1 November 2004 127 99 10 April 2006
53 35 8 November 2004 128 100 18 April 2006
54 36 15 November 2004 129 101 24 April 2006
56 37 29 November 2004 130 102 2 May 2006
57 38 6 December 2004 131 103 8 May 2006
58 39 13 December 2004 133 104 22 May 2006
(Continued)
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Table A1. (Continued)
Week
no. (w)
Obs
(t) Day Month Year
Week
no. (w)
Obs
(t) Day Month Year
61 40 3 January 2005 134 105 30 May 2006
62 41 10 January 2005 135 106 5 June 2006
63 42 17 January 2005 136 107 12 June 2006
64 43 24 January 2005 137 108 19 June 2006
66 44 7 February 2005 138 109 26 June 2006
67 45 14 February 2005 139 110 3 July 2006
68 46 21 February 2005 140 111 10 July 2006
69 47 28 February 2005 141 112 17 July 2006
70 48 7 March 2005 142 113 24 July 2006
71 49 14 March 2005 143 114 1 August 2006
72 50 21 March 2005 144 115 7 August 2006
73 51 28 March 2005 145 116 14 August 2006
74 52 4 April 2005 146 117 21 August 2006
75 53 11 April 2005 147 118 29 August 2006
76 54 18 April 2005 148 119 4 September 2006
77 55 25 April 2005 149 120 11 September 2006
78 56 2 May 2005 150 121 18 September 2006
79 57 9 May 2005 151 122 25 September 2006
80 58 16 May 2005 152 123 2 October 2006
81 59 23 May 2005 153 124 9 October 2006
82 60 30 May 2005 154 125 16 October 2006
83 61 6 June 2005 155 126 23 October 2006
84 62 13 June 2005 156 127 30 October 2006
85 63 20 June 2005 157 128 6 November 2006
89 64 18 July 2005 158 129 13 November 2006
90 65 25 July 2005 / / / / /
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